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Statutes of Limitations in Legal Malpractice
Norman T. Baxter*
S TATUTES OF LIMITATIONS exist in the civil law of all the states and the
federal government. Depending on the type of action, a limitation
period may vary anywhere from a year or less up to twenty-one years
or more.
Not all states agree on which actions need a limitation statute, and
not all states apply the same limitation period for similar actions; e.g.,
the limitation period for applying the statute of limitations in legal
malpractice is three years in New York,1 two years in California,2 and
only one year in Ohio.3
The first step in understanding the differences in the various state
laws is to answer the question as to what statutes of limitations are,
and what are they intended to do.
Basically, statutes of limitations are barriers erected in the law
to bar a plaintiff from getting a judgment after an undue lapse of time
from when the original action arose.4 Statutes of limitations are de-
signed so that the required litigation must be brought while the facts
and circumstances may still be proved 5 and before prosecution of the
claim has become stale.0 Statutes of limitations try to prevent what
would amount to a surprise attack on the defendant after the passing
of time in which he may no longer be able to find facts with which
to defend himself. Fortunately for defendants, statutes of limitation
are founded on the presumption that valid claims are not normally
neglected. 7
Statutes of limitations theoretically set out that which is a reason-
able time for bringing an action. This defined "reasonable time" is de-
signed to do away with the general inconvenience which can result
from a threatened lawsuit where the necessary facts are no longer avail-
able." Modern courts, therefore, accord the statute of limitations the
* B.B.A., Cleveland State Univ.; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School; employed at Diamond Shamrock Corporation in Cleveland.
1 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Laws and Rules § 214, subd. 6 (1963). As to forms of pleading in
such cases, see, Oleck, Negligence Forms of Pleading, 717-766 (1957 rev. ed.).
2 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 339, subd. 1 (1963).
3 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11 (1953).
4 Christmas v. Russell,. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866).
5 People ex rel. Mendes v. Pennyfeather, 11 Misc.2d 546, 174 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Child. Ct.
1958).
6 Weber v. State Harbor Comm'n., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873).
7 Ibid.
8 Lenawee County v. Nutten, 234 Mich. 391, 208 N.W. 613 (1926).
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same consideration as any other defense, due to the statute's beneficial
effect of promoting the best interests of society.9
A major problem in any discussion of legal malpractice is under-
standing of what is meant by the term. When used in general terms,
malpractice can refer to the negligence of a member of any professional
group. This can, however, be limited to the professional misconduct of
any one group or groups, depending upon the legal definition of the
term when a specific statute is enacted.10
The problem of defining the term would then seem to be resolved
rather easily, i.e., all that would be required is to study the state
statutes concerning malpractice and discern whether or not legal mal-
practice is included therein. Unfortunately, as late as 1962, only 17
states had special statutes of limitations for malpractice actions, and
of these only 12 list what groups are included under the statute.'
It becomes apparent from an analysis of cases and law that many
jurisdictions, when using the term malpractice, limit the term strictly
to physicians and surgeons. It is not so much the fact that legal mal-
practice is excluded from the term malpractice but rather that it is
never even mentioned.
A reference to dictionaries does not necessarily resolve the prob-
lem. In an Ohio case,1 2 plaintiff's counsel tried to show that lawyers
were not included under the term "malpractice," by citing Webster's
Dictionary, Anderson's Law Dictionary, Standard Dictionary, Century
Dictionary, Bouvier's Law Dictionary, and other sources. At the same
time, opposing counsel cited American Digest, Century Digest, Ohio
Digest, and other pleading and practice volumes to show that lawyers
were included under the term.
The problem of defining terms in the above case was resolved by
referring to the legal meaning of the term as used by the state legisla-
ture when the statute was enacted. This solution points out the real
problem with the term, i.e., the definition of legal malpractice in any
state depends on how that state has cared to define or not to define
the term.
But why have so few legislatures cared to define and use the term
legal malpractice? Perhaps the answer is that malpractice actions
against attorneys are comparatively few, due to the high ethical stand-
ards maintained by the great majority of lawyers.' 3 On the other hand,
9 Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. State, 66 Wash.2d 570, 403 P.2d 880 (1965).
10 Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964).
11 Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdic-
tions, 47 Cornell L.Q. 339 (1962).
12 Long v. Bowersox, 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 249, 19 Ohio Dec. 494 (C.P. 1909).
13 Gardner, Attorneys' Malpractice, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 264 (1957).
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perhaps cases are few because of the difficulty of proving that the lawyer
has failed to use reasonable care and diligence in his work.1 4
Since legal malpractice appears to be a matter of state definition,
it would seem that perhaps the best approach to understanding legal
malpractice would be to examine (as typical) the statutes of three of
our leading states, to see what is the present status of their laws on
the subject.
Malpractice in Ohio
Ohio is one of the states which has a limitations statute which in-
cludes malpractice actions. The statute reads as follows: "An action
for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprison-
ment, malpractice, . . . shall be brought within one year after the cause
thereof accrued. . . ., 15
Although Ohio is not one of the states to list those groups that
are included under the statute, 16 as early as 1909, the courts maintained
that legal malpractice is included under the term "malpractice." 17
The statute, however, did not always include malpractice. It was
in 1894 that Ohio General Assembly amended the statute in order to
include the actions for malpractice. This was done presumably to de-
feat "the possibility of unwarranted claims which would be difficult to
disprove." 'r The courts early concluded that the term malpractice
"whatever the definition the dictionary gave it, had a particular legal
meaning in Ohio when the section was amended, with which the legis-
lature dealt, and that actions against attorneys were included in that
amendment." 19
After it was generally held that legal malpractice was included
under the statute, problems arose about when the period of limitation
begins to run. The leading Ohio case on the subject concerned an action
by a client against an attorney for nonfeasance for failure to file a work-
men's compensation claim within the necessary time. The court here
upheld the accepted view in Ohio, i.e., that the limitation period begins
to run at the time the nonfeasance occurred, and the claim was there-
fore barred by the statute if not brought within one year from that
time.20
The time at which the period begins to run is especially important
when it is uncertain in what capacity the defendant was acting. In a
14 Hodges v. Carter, 239 No. Car. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954).
15 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11 (1953).
16 Lillich, op. cit. supra note 11.
17 Long v. Bowersox, supra note 12.
18 Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 372, 199 N.E.2d 878, 880 (1964).
19 Long v. Bowersox, 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 249, 254, 19 Ohio Dec. 494, 497 (C.P. 1909).
20 Galloway v. Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941).
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case involving an action against a defendant for alleged malpractice,
an examination of the evidence was necessary to disclose that the
defendant was acting not as a Justice of the Peace but as a lawyer,
and that the limitation period would therefore expire in one year from
the time of the acts constituting malpractice.21
Although malpractice can refer to the professional negligence of
a member of any group,22 Ohio Court decisions generally limit the
terminology to lawyers, physicians and surgeons. However, some Ohio
court decisions have allowed malpractice actions against dentists,23
pharmacists 24 and veterinarians, 25 while at the same time barring actions
against nurses26 and surveyors.2 7
Although the statute of limitations as to malpractice is applied to
both attorneys and the medical practice, there is an important distinc-
tion as to how the statute is applied to each of these groups. Whereas
in legal malpractice the statute begins to run at the time of the act, in
medical malpractice the statute in Ohio does not begin to run until
the relation of physician and patient has terminated.28 This is the latest
time at which the action will begin to run.29 This is so regardless of
whether or not the act was known or unknown at the time, by the
person upon whom it was committed.30
This is the rule in Ohio, although some courts of other jurisdictions
have followed a rule in medical malpractice similar to the Ohio rule
on legal malpractice, i.e., the statute begins to run at the time the patient
is harmed.31
The theory that the Ohio malpractice statute should be applied
to attorneys in the same way as it is applied to the medical practice
was argued in the case of Galloway v. Hood.32 The court's reply was
that this was simply "not the law" in malpractice cases by attorneys,
no matter how harsh the law may appear to be. In furthering its opin-
ion, the court cited the medical malpractice case of Bowers v. Santee3s
where it was said:
21 Bickel v. Whitacre, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 256 (Ct. App. 1939).
22 Richardson v. Doe, supra note 10.
23 Cox v. Cartwright, 96 Ohio App. 245, 121 N.E.2d 673 (1953).
24 Boudot v. Schwallie, 114 Ohio App. 495, 178 N.E.2d 599 (1961).
25 Storozuk v. W. A. Butler Co., 31 Ohio Op. 2d 91, 203 N.E.2d 511 (C.P. 1964).
26 Richardson v. Doe, supra note 10.
27 Wishnek v. Gulla, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 49, 114 N.E.2d 914 (C.P. 1953).
28 Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
29 Pump v. Fox, 113 Ohio App. 150, 177 N.E.2d 520 (1961).
30 De Long v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
31 Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kans. 45, 58 P.2d 475 (1936).
32 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941).
33 99 Ohio St. 361, 368, 124 N.E. 238, 240 (1919).
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. . . manifestly the subsequent care and treatment was as essential
to full recovery and restoration of usefulness as was the initial set-
ting.
. .. The surgeon should have all reasonable time and oppor-
tunity to correct the evils which made operation or treatment nec-
essary, and even reasonable time and opportunity to correct the
ordinary and usual mistakes incident to even skilled surgery.
The court therefore reasoned that there was little need for "aftercare"
or "opportunity to correct evils" on the part of the attorney, after the
statute had run due to his delay.34
Malpractice in New York
Although the Ohio law has had no changes in its malpractice statute
for many years, the New York law in recent years has seen important
changes in its law and in its interpretation.
The former New York law3 5 had required that an action for mal-
practice must be commenced within two years after the cause of action
has accrued.
The present New York law36 has been revised to read as follows:
Actions to be commenced within three years: for nonpayment of
money collected on execution; for penalty created by statute; to
recover chattel; to injury to property; for personal injury; for mal-
practice; to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud.
Under the older New York law (the Civil Practice Act) the term
malpractice was not intended to cover attorneys and other non-medical
professionals.3 7 It has been consistently held that under the Civil Prac-
tice Act the term malpractice was limited to actions to recover damages
for injuries resulting from the malpractice of physicians, surgeons, and
other similar professionals. 38 Under this law, dentists, psychiatrists,
chiropractors, pharmacists, and X-ray technicians have been included,
whereas nurses, hospital employees, accountants, and attorneys have
been excluded. 39
The seeming disparity in the application of this malpractice statute
goes back to the problem of what is meant by the term "malpractice."
Generally speaking, malpractice refers to the professional negligence of
any professional group.40 However, in New York, unlike Ohio, the
34 Galloway v. Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 281, 43 N.E.2d 631, 633 (1941).
35 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 50, subd. 1 (now N.Y. Civ. Prac. Laws and Rules § 214, subd.
6,1963).
36 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Laws and Rules § 214, subd. 6 (1963).
37 Peters v. Powell, 22 Misc.2d 994, 196 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
38 Seger v. Cornwell, 44 Misc.2d 994, 255 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
39 Lillich, op. cit. supra note 11.
40 Richardson v. Doe, supra note 10.
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generally accepted and legal meaning of the term did not include
attorneys.
The practice in New York had been to restrict the term malpractice
to actions to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from the
misconduct of physicians, surgeons, and other similar professionals
similar to those enumerated.41 The result was that the general practice
in New York was to restrict the term malpractice to physical personal
injuries as opposed to injury to property.
Therefore, since it would be almost impossible to show that the
harm caused by attorneys was physical, the rule that had been applied
to attorneys was that, depending on the facts of the case and whether
or not there was an agreement to obtain a specific result, the three
year statute of limitations for negligence or the six year statute for
contracts would apply.42
Effective September 1, 1963, the New York statute which covered
malpractice was revised to extend the limitation period to three years.
More important, from the standpoint of attorney's malpractice, attor-
neys, accountants, and other similar professionals are now included
under the new statute. In fact, the legislature's intention was made
clear in the Advisory Committee Notes, where it was said that "an action
to recover damages for malpractice was added on the suggestion that
malpractice involving property damage-e.g., against an accountant-
may be based on a contract theory and would otherwise be governed
by the six-year provision unless specific reference was made." 43
A recently reported case on this matter involved a malpractice
action against a surveyor. Here, the court said that, although it had
been generally understood that malpractice actions pertained only to
members of the medical profession, all malpractice actions, whether
they pertain to personal or property damage, are included under the
present three year statute.4 1
The question then arises as to when the three year limitation period
begins to run. Under a strict application of the New York law the
action accrues at the time of the act which constitutes malpractice.
Cases decided under the Civil Practice Act had held that the
cause of action accrued at the time of the malpractice and not at the
time when the injury was discovered.4.
The discovery doctrine has again been advocated under the law
as it is at present. This argument, however, has again been rejected on
41 Federal International Banking Co. v. Touche, 248 N.Y. 517, 162 N.E. 507 (1928).
42 Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Reynolds, 3 App. Div. 2d 686, 159 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1957).
43 5th Report, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 15, p. 56 (1961).
44 Seger v. Cornwell, supra note 38.
45 Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (1930).
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the basis that in this regard the legislature has indicated no intention
to amend or abandon the present rule.46
In the face of rejection of the discovery doctrine, many plaintiffs
have tried to avoid strict application of the statute by arguing one of
the following theories: a. action for breach of contract; b. action for
fraud; c. continuous treatment theory.47 The New York courts have
recognized the hardships which can be involved in strictly applying the
statute, and have adopted the continuous treatment theory, at least in
regard to medical malpractice. The cases have ruled that the limitation
period has not begun to run until the end of post-operative care or at
the conclusion of the patient's last treatment.48
By the same token, New York courts have adopted a rule similar
to the Ohio rule in regard to professionals in fields other than medicine.
Two recently reported decisions have borne out the distinction in the
law's application. The first of these cases concerned an action against a
surveyor. Here the court made it clear that, although the new law in
New York would include individuals such as surveyors, the limitation
period began upon the commission and not the discovery of the mal-
practice. 49 The second case concerned a plaintiff's malpractice action
against his former attorney for failure of the attorney to timely file
and prosecute plaintiff's personal injury claim. Here again the court
ruled that plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute for failure of the
plaintiff to bring his action within three years from the time the at-
torney failed to file. This was so despite the fact that the plaintiff al-
leged fraud on the attorney's part and also despite the fact that the
attorney had continued to "treat" the plaintiff by attempting to get the
matter settled in arbitration proceedings subsequent to the time the
personal injury claim expired.50
Malpractice in California
Although both Ohio and New York have statutes which use the
term malpractice and which apply the term to legal malpractice cases,
the state of California does not use these terms in its statutes.
The following are the applicable statutes with regard to malpractice
in the state of California:
Within two years: An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability
not founded upon an instrument of writing, other than that men-
tioned in Subdivision 2 § 330 of code, .. r,
46 Schwartz v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d
714 (1963).
47 Lillich, op. cit. supra note 11.
48 Monko v. St. John's Queens Hospital, 41 Misc.2d 993, 246 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
49 Seger v. Cornwell, supra note 38.
50 Siegel v. Kranis, 52 Misc.2d 78, 274 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
51 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 339, subd. 1 (1961).
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Within one year: An action for libel, slander, assault, battery,
false imprisonment, seduction below the age of legal consent, or
for injury to or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another, . . .52
Although it is not clear from a mere reading of the statutes, the
two year limitation statute applies to legal malpractice actions,5 3 and
the one year statute applies to medical malpractice actions.
54
In a case recently decided by the California Supreme Court, the
court made it clear that a malpractice action against an attorney falls
within the two year period as set out in Section 339. The court cited
that medical malpractice actions have been consistently held to sound
in tort and therefore are covered by the one year statute, that an action
against an attorney sounds in contract rather than tort, and that there
was no reason why this distinction should be disturbed. 55
The court also referred to the fact that the two year limitation
period has been applied to attorney's negligence cases since as early as
1886.56
Although the California statutes do not mention malpractice per se
in their statutes, as do Ohio and New York statutes, the California
courts do line up with the Ohio and New York courts in agreement as
to when the limitation period begins to run, i.e., the limitation period
for legal malpractice actions in California runs from the time of the
negligent act.57
In explaining what they meant by the time of the negligent act, the
court in the Griffith case made it clear that "the act of negligence oc-
curred when the attorney misadvised plaintiff, even though the plaintiff
did not discover the negligence nor the fact that he had been damaged
thereby until later." 58
In furtherance of this opinion, California courts have rejected both
the theory that the cause of action accrues at the time of discovery of
the negligence59 and also the theory that the cause of action did not
accrue until the attorney had carried out the entire plan which he was
hired to do.60
52 Ibid. § 340, subd. 3 (1963).
53 Jensen v. Sprigg, 84 Cal. App. 519, 258 P. 683 (1927).
54 Weinstock v. Eissler, 224 Cal.App.2d 212, 36 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1964).
55 Alter v. Michael, 50 Cal.Rptr. 553, 413 P.2d 153 (1966).
56 Hays v. Ewing, 70 Cal. 127, 11 P. 602 (1886).
57 Griffith v. Zavlaris, 215 Cal.App.2d 826, 30 Cal.Rptr. 517 (1963).
58 Id. at 828.
59 Bustamante v. Haet, 222 Cal.App.2d 413, 35 Cal.Rptr. 176 (1963).
60 Eckert v. Schaal, 58 Cal.Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1967).
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In keeping with the views of other states, the limitation period rule
in California vis-a-vis medical malpractice is quite different from the
legal malpractice rule. Not only does Section 340 provide for a one year
limitation period, but also in its application the limitation period is said
to accrue at a different time.
With regard to medical malpractice, the rule in California is not
the same as in Ohio and New York. The rule in California is that the
action does not begin to run until the patient discovers his injury or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered it.61
Although the above is the rule followed in California, the California
courts have also said that the cause of action would not normally run
while the physician-patient relationship continues, unless the patient
has discovered or should have discovered the injury. The rule has also
been applied in California courts where the action asserted is one of
fraudulent concealment by the physician.62
Plaintiffs in legal malpractice actions have tried to argue that legal
malpractice actions should also run from the date of discovery of the
injury. Courts have pointed out, however, that although the rule in
legal malpractice actions may seem harsh, it is still the "time honored"
rule in California and any changes should be made by the Legislature.63
Summary and Conclusion
The statutes examined above presumably are representative of the
leading thinking on the malpractice statutes in this country. These three
states, however, reveal some large differences in both the content and
application of the statutes as they affect legal malpractice.
As mentioned previously, New York has a three year limitation
period in legal malpractice actions, California two years, and Ohio one
year. In Ohio and New York the same statute is applied in legal and
medical malpractice actions; in California different statutes apply, which
have different limitation periods. In Ohio, malpractice actions have been
expressly included by name; New York has recently changed its law to
expressly include malpractice by name; whereas, in California, there is
no specific mention made of malpractice.
The states do, however, agree on one critical point, i.e., the statute
of limitations in legal malpractice runs from the time of the negligent
act. Courts of each of the states examined have, at various times, been
confronted with the sometimes harsh effects of the application of this
rule, especially when it is compared to the "continuous treatment" or
the "severance of the physician-patient relationship" rule in medical
malpractice in New York and Ohio and the "discovery doctrine" in Cali-
61 Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 139 Cal.App.2d, 293 P.2d 816 (1956).
62 Weinstock v. Eissler, supra note 54.
63 Griffith v. Zavlaris, 215 Cal.App.2d 826, 828, 30 Cal.Rptr. 517, 520 (1963).
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fornia. The courts' formula for these comparisons has been that any
necessary changes in the law are matters of legislative (not judicial)
concern.
Therefore, since any changes in the law are a matter of legislative
action, it is the writer's opinion that the state legislators may find it
worthwhile to consider the following suggestions:
1. Change the law so that the term malpractice is specifically
mentioned and its meaning is defined and clear. This will help dispel
the confusion and the growth of various contrived theories which can
result from the use of hazy language.
2. Change the law so that the limitation period is the same for all
malpractice actions whether legal, medical or otherwise. A two year
limitation period would appear to be reasonable since it would give
plaintiffs sufficient time to prepare and present claims, and the defend-
ants would not be burdened with presenting facts which may no longer
be available.
3. Change the law so that the limitation period accrues at the
same time for all actions. The limitation period for legal malpractice
actions, which runs from the time of the negligent act, is obviously
unfair to plaintiffs who, being unfamiliar with the law, may not recog-
nize when a negligent act has occurred, especially so when the attorney
may continue to advise and act for his client in the same or similar
matters. If the rule were the same for all malpractice actions then there
could be no charges of favoritism or discrimination for any particular
group.
The California rule applied in medical malpractice cases, i.e., the
cause of action accrues on discovery of the harm or when the harm
should have been discovered, would seem to be best and most equitable
rule to be adopted for all malpractice actions. Under this rule, no
plaintiff will be penalized for failure to bring an action for a harm
which he did not know existed. Also, such a rule may have the bene-
ficial effect of reducing malpractice actions, since attorneys as well as
other professionals may tend to be more careful in the use of their
professional skills.
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